This
week’s readings examined linguistic failures on children’s parts when it comes
to scalar implicature, which, in Stiller’s words, is “the conversational
shorthand of using weak terms to imply the negation of stronger ones that lie
along the same “scale” (Stiller 1). According to Stiller, “children fail
overwhelmingly at scalar pragmatic tasks where adults succeed” (Stiller 2), and
that “children with syntactic mastery of quantifiers such as “some” and “none”
still failed to make the some/not-all implicature” (Stiller 2). Stiller cites
the statistic that “87% of children accepted statements such as “Some elephants
have trunks” whereas only 41% of adults did” (Stiller 2) as being proof of
children’s inability to apply scalar implicature, but I don’t necessarily read
that stat as being a black mark against childhood psycholinguistics.
More
than anything, these readings reminded me of chain emails that used to be
passed around in middle school (about 2006-ish) that asked seemingly simple
questions and instead tripped up adults on what should be common-sense
observations. These emails would ask about a cheetah opening a refrigerator and
eating the food, and then ask another question about an elephant opening a
refrigerator and eating food – however, the elephant cannot eat any food
because it’s already been eaten by the cheetah. As adults, we are taught to
generalize and view the world by the rules through which we have been told it
is governed. Stiller says that the criteria for their experiments were “ad-hoc
scales—scales constructed from contextual, rather than conventional linguistic
factors” (Stiller 5). That is likely the reason adults performed
better on disambiguating linguistic expressions; the age discrepancy is more
due to the social conditioning and contextual experience that adults have
already gained than something inherently missing in childhood developmental
psychology. As adults, we assume
that the baseline that we have established for the world – such as, “all
elephants have trunks” or “the sky is blue” as absolute truths that do not
vary, when, in fact, they vary quite a bit, between the poaching industry and
sunrises, sunsets, or storms, respectively.
Children who hear that Mary “had in fact
eaten the whole cake (eating all entails eating some), [so] her utterance…
implies that she did not” (Barner 1) probably wouldn’t care that Mary had only eaten a portion of John’s cake – Mary
did still, in fact, consume something that wasn’t hers, and the differentiation
in scalar implicature would therefore be irrelevant. Children’s inability to
process scalar implicature is not necessarily a failing, as scalar implicature
seems to me to be just a feature of communication and psychological delineation
that we have decided to employ in order to make general intuitive leaps easier,
even if that generalization later proves to not cover all possible scenarios.
Side
note: I also found the Grice maxim that Stiller quotes – “make your
contribution as informative as is required, and do not make your contribution
more informative than is required” (Stiller 1) really entertaining, as that
sentence essentially sums up every piece of writing advice I’ve ever heard,
both in and out of formal education.
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