In the Barner article, we are introduced to the concept of scalar implicature. I've never had a full grasp of what "scale implicature" really means but upon reading this article, I arrived a t a much clearer understanding. It struck me as interesting that there was a term for this when I've always associated "some" as "not all". Indeed, when I analyze "some" more, it has never occurred to me that "some" for children can also mean "all". For example, in the sentence, "Some of my money is in my pocket" seems so obvious that I am saying only a part of my money is stored in my pocket and not all. Perhaps that is the result of years of education and a broadening of my perspectives.
In Stiller's paper, we are exploring three different experiments he conducts with a group of children, all surrounding the idea of "ad-hoc" scalar implicature, i.e scales that are derived from contextual rather than conventional linguistic factors. Later in Stiller's paper, he goes into experiments 2 and 3 where he explores two different theories of the nature of implicature, i.e. the counterfactual and linguistic alternatives theories.
I'm interested in seeing how these articles of scale implicature ties into what we discussed in class about implicit bias and stereotypes. Maybe there is a connection between the fact that implicit bias and scalar implicature are merely functions of the brain in that as we become older, our brains develop more and we gain more worldly experiences, we understand scale implicature, at least on a subconscious level (everytime we see "some", we don't pause to reconsider what "some" means"), which ties well into implicit bias, which is bias that has been engrained in our brains at a subconscious level. The key connector here is the subconscious. I'm interested in learning more about how the subconscious plays a role in language (such as scalar implicature and more) and comprehension (such as listening to others or even making snap judgements about people based on superficial cues). The idea of stereotyping plays very tightly into the first topic of implicit bias as well, so that's also a talking point as well.
As a followup to the idea of scalar implicature, I wonder if there is a more of an influence by our environment (i.e. experiences and talking to others) or by the pure development of new neural connections in the brain (so that we can process more information) or both, that we are able to pick up scale implicature, as evidenced by the Stiller research study. I'd imagine it's a combination of both, but I definitely think it is hard to quantify.
In high school, I remember distinctly using the quantifier "some" in many different scenarios. When asked in interviews which swimming events I swam, I often replied "some long-distance, but mostly sprints". Ideas like this now seem jaded because I use this phrase often without thinking twice, but now that I've been exposed to scalar implicature and the subconscious's role in the development and learning of language, I'm thinking about this more and even though I don't have a good answer, I'm definitely more cognizant of this than before.
Also, I thought this video summarized implicature (scalar included) well!
I enjoyed reading your thoughtful comments on our two assigned papers this week. However, I was a little worried when you stated how scalar implicature differs in the minds of adults and children because of "brain capabilities of adults vs children" and a "lack of understanding of scalar implicature" in children of a "young age" versus a "more developed age." Barner talks about how children are perfectly capable of processing demands required by other "well-documented inferences" and that "there is no difference in the processing demands required by these well-documented inferences and the inferences required by scalar implicature. The only salient difference is the particular scale being processed - i.e., numerals rather than quantifiers." Therefore, to my understanding, Barner is arguing that children do not lack something in their development or their brains that makes them unable to process scalar implicatures. Instead, he argues that children are simply not exposed to the scale of quantifiers like they are exposed to the scale of numbers. For example, he states, "Critically, studies of early number word acquisition find that children begin to explicitly memorize a count list before they learn any numeral meanings, and recite it like the alphabet (Fuson, 1988). In contrast, no child is taught to recite quantifiers in a song. Thus, when interpreting utterances containing some, children may be unaware that their knowledge of all is relevant, since some and all have not been associated as scalar alternatives" (pg. 90). Therefore, we can conclude that it is merely children's lack of exposure to "all" and "some" as alternatives, rather than a brain developmental issue, that makes scalar implicature difficult for them.
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