Lupyan’s primary contribution is to contest that we do not internalize words as mathematical, objective concepts, but rather contextual ideas that then shape our perception of those things in the real world; hence, our conception of ‘triangle’ not as a three-sided object but instead an equilateral three-sided shape with its edge flush to the ground. Perhaps the most interesting implication of this – aside from those that commenters below have suggested – is that it provides an intuitive model for how we pick up and refine linguistic concepts.
The first interaction we have with a triangle is, sure enough, a ‘regular’ equilateral one; it would be fascinating, therefore, to learn whether young children recognize any scalene triangle as a triangle, or rather have a singular definition. What Lupyan’s results suggest is that over time, people’s definitions of words expand, but when asked to settle on a ‘natural’ definition they defer to their original conception of what might be right. It is clear why such a system of learning is evolutionarily optimal: it allows small words to convey great communal meaning for those interpretations which are most common, while letting people have more expansive ‘formal’ definitions of words.
Rickford adds to this by explaining distinct elements of African American linguistic upbringing, which suggests (again) that people often create their own independent cultural definitions of words which they then use to carry distinct cultural meaning. This complements the Lupyan hypothesis of culturally-inculcated, specific meaning by suggesting that subcultures of society can create their own definitions which are internally consistent and accepted.
The issue that is touched on (at least tangentially) with this cultural norm is a general social harm: when cultures create self-definitions that clash or mar with the predominant culture’s norms (ex. some of the linguistic features of Ebonics that Rickford outlines), the consequence can be discriminatory behavior. Linguistic convention, thus serving as a cultural marker, can end up disadvantaging the very people who forge an identity for themselves. What is therefore a universal good in the conception of Lupyan – insofar as it allows for rapid meaning – becomes a potential harm for Rickford in the reality of how it manifests itself.
Rickford adds to this by explaining distinct elements of African American linguistic upbringing, which suggests (again) that people often create their own independent cultural definitions of words which they then use to carry distinct cultural meaning. This complements the Lupyan hypothesis of culturally-inculcated, specific meaning by suggesting that subcultures of society can create their own definitions which are internally consistent and accepted.
The issue that is touched on (at least tangentially) with this cultural norm is a general social harm: when cultures create self-definitions that clash or mar with the predominant culture’s norms (ex. some of the linguistic features of Ebonics that Rickford outlines), the consequence can be discriminatory behavior. Linguistic convention, thus serving as a cultural marker, can end up disadvantaging the very people who forge an identity for themselves. What is therefore a universal good in the conception of Lupyan – insofar as it allows for rapid meaning – becomes a potential harm for Rickford in the reality of how it manifests itself.
I agree with you that we have "culturally-inculcated" mental depictions of items. In psychology, these are simply called heuristics (why don't either of the authors use this vocabulary?). You're right to think that the consequences of heuristics can cause discriminatory behavior. There are many psychology studies that people more likely and more quick to identify an African-American man as holding a weapon than their white counterpart when asked to make snap judgements about an image of a person clutching an object. Though heuristics play a crucial evolutionary role, these studies show we need to be wary about how and when we are using them.
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