Gussenhoven gives a condensed account of the role various anatomical structures play in speech production. These anatomical structures, collectively referred to as the organs of speech (though the original functions of all of these organs are not related to speech), include the larynx, pharynx, mouth and nasal cavity. Gussenhoven provides physiological explanations for vocal characteristics (e.g., speech is higher pitched when the vocal folds, housed in the larynx, open and close more rapidly) as well as specifications of where and how particular phonemes are produced.
Kenstowicz points out that the very same phoneme may have many, sometimes significantly different, pronunciations. These different pronunciations are called allophones. Whether a letter is to be pronounced as a certain allophone is determined by the context in which that letter appears according to certain rules which most people are not prepared to articulate but which they are all said to tacitly know. Kenstowicz goes on to spell out some of those rules for the phoneme [t]. These rules are couched in a vocabulary that references the physiology of speech production, showing the importance anatomical understanding has for the study of phonology more broadly.
I was very intrigued by the contention that there are 'unconscious' rules guiding our everyday speech production. This is, as Kenstowicz concedes, mysterious. For in paradigmatic cases of an agent 'following a rule', the rule enters into the agent's activities by being consciously applied in the context of a practice. That is, the agent uses the rule as a reason for their own actions or as a reference for critiquing the actions of others. Seeing as these unconscious rules do not enter into any such practice, what makes a case of acting in accordance with them a case of 'following' them?
I really like the interesting point you make on the nature of these supposed "rules." It seems almost as though these rules could somehow be physical – as in a person can not help but speak in a way. Of course, this is probably not entirely true, since we can consciously try and "break" at least some of these rules, for example by enunciating the "t" in "pants."
ReplyDeleteInteresting point about rules -- unfortunately, I disagree with the notion of a rule '[entering] into the agent's activities by being consciously applied in the context of a practice' because rules are abstract objects which are timeless and have no causal interaction with concrete objects such as practices, etc. Good try, though!
ReplyDelete